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Honestly I tell you. When did we rebel, with what? We didn't have any weapons 
and there were no army deserters with the Indonesian Communist Party [PKI]— 
these are all lies.
Lies Sari, "South Blitar: A Forgotten Place"* 1
[The base in] South Blitar was defeated, but a positive aspect of the defeat was 
that the PKI rediscovered its path, the path of armed revolution as the best 
defense against armed counterrevolutionaries.
Defense statement of Mohammad Munir,
PKI Central Committee member, March 2 ,19732
The Suharto New Order regime justified the massacre of half a million leftists in 
1965-66 and the imprisonment of hundreds of thousands by implicating the 
Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI) in the coup attempt of
* This research is part of a larger research project entitled "Islam and the Politics of Memory in Post- 
Authoritarian Indonesia," supported under the Australian Research Council's Discovery Project Funding 
Scheme (project DPO772760). Many thanks to Kate McGregor, Vera Mackie, and anonymous reviewers for 
their valuable comments and to the Indonesian Institute of Social History and Lakpesdam NU Blitar for 
allowing me access to their interview collection.
1 Lies Sari, "Blitar Selatan yang dilupakan" [South Blitar: A Forgotten Place], unpublished manuscript, n.d., 
supplied to the author, p. 2.
2 Munir was sentenced to death in 1973 and was executed on May 14,1985. An appeal to the High Court 
regarding his death sentence was rejected in 1981. "Execution of Mohammed Munir," Economic and 
Political Weekly 20,32 (1985): 1,327.
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September 30, 1965. The regime's version of history, that the PKI was responsible for 
the coup attempt, has had lasting effects on Indonesian society generally, but also on 
how former political prisoners accused of being members of the PKI understand, and, 
in turn, refashion the past. The opening quotes highlight a key tension, for example, in 
the way two former South Blitar fugitives narrated an aspect of this past, when, after 
the initial purges, surviving party leaders and members regrouped in South Blitar, East 
Java, from 1967 to 1968. That strategy was a tactical retreat, to ensure survival of the 
remaining members and to formulate ways to resist the army takeover in Indonesia. 
When survivors and relatives talk about this period of the party's history, they are 
concerned not to reinforce the long-held assumption of the PKI's complicity in the coup 
attempt, or to suggest a broader pattern of PKI resistance in the aftermath of the 
purges.
The catchphrase "South Blitar" denotes the southern part of the Blitar District, an 
area of about 3,200 square kilometers, south of the city of Blitar, adjacent to the districts 
of Tulungagung and Malang. All three districts border the Indian Ocean on the 
southern side. The Brantas River divides the Blitar District into two parts, the north 
and south. The South Blitar area is predominantly limestone country, quite 
mountainous, with uncertain rainfall, and in the 1960s, there were few roads. The 
people's staple foods in the 1960s were mainly cassava and corn, eaten twice a day. 
Coconut was available, and gardens growing vegetables, such as beans, pumpkin, and 
sweet potatoes, augmented this diet. Rice was reserved for special occasions. The local 
population was mainly engaged in subsistence farming. A government survey showed 
that villagers in Bakung and Suruhwadang lived in houses with walls made of woven 
bamboo and relied on oil lamps for lighting.3 They had no running water. Most 
households had no personal transportation, not even bicycles. (By contrast, those in 
Blitar City, some twenty kilometers away, had access to bikes and other modes of 
transportation.) Due to the South Blitar's mountainous terrain and limited arable land, 
there were no large-scale plantations in this area. The PKI had been quite successful in 
this area, receiving approximately 85 percent of the vote in the 1955 elections.4 Leftist 
mass organizations such as the Peasants' Union (Barisan Tani Indonesia, BTI) and the 
People's Cultural Institute (Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat, Lekra) had also flourished 
here.
During June-September 1968, the army's Brawijaya Division mounted a 
counterinsurgency campaign, Operasi Trisula (Trident Operation), to rout the 
communists out of South Blitar, during which actions hundreds of people were killed 
or arrested. New Order representations of this operation through books, films, 
museum exhibits, and the Trisula monument portray the communists as having 
organized an armed uprising. They portray the Trisula offensive as a form of 
cooperation between the villagers of South Blitar and the army, and suggest that PKI's
3 Conditions affecting South Blitar families after the 1968 Trisula operation are discussed in a university 
study, Institut Keguruan dan Ilmu Pendidikan (KIP), Surabaya and Balai Penelitian Pendidikan, Laporan 
pelaksanaan survey foster-care tentang anak-anak korban G.30.S/P.K.I.: di daerah Blitar Selatan dan tjalon keluarga 
asuhan di Ketjamatan Bagor Kabupaten Ngandjuk dan di-Kotamadya Blitar (Surabaja, 1971), pp. 35-36, with a 
view to presenting a much better outlook for the South Blitar children if they were to be taken out and 
cared for by foster families in Nganjuk District and Blitar City.
4 Semdam VIII Brawidjaja, Operasi Trisula Kodam VIII Brawidjaja (Surabaya: Jajasan Taman 
Tjandrawilwatikta, 1969). p. 30
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Trisula Monument in Bakung, South Blitar, commemorating the 1968 operation 
Photo: Vannessa Hearman
Trisula Monument in Bakung, South Blitar depicting cooperation during the Trisula between different 
sections of the armed forces and local villagers. Photo: Vannessa Hearman
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South Blitar base-of-operations represented a critical threat to the nation.5 Under the 
New Order, Indonesians were encouraged to accept unquestioningly the government's 
assertion that the communists had attempted the violent overthrow of the Sukarno 
government in 1965, and also to accept the need for unceasing battle against 
communism. Today, when South Blitar survivors tell their own versions of what 
occurred at the base, their personal stories and memories are shaped by these army- 
imposed representations.
In this context, how do survivors deal with the New Order's representation of the 
South Blitar episode as proof that the party's leadership and followers attempted to 
organize a violent uprising in that region of East Java? I will examine some of the 
impacts of the New Order's version of history about South Blitar on its survivors. I 
explore how the mainstream narrative about South Blitar affects the consciousness of 
former political prisoners, who themselves have tried to resist the New Order narrative 
more generally. I also seek to reconstruct this period of the PKI's history based on the 
accounts of its survivors. I examine the origins of the base itself, life in South Blitar 
prior to the Trisula operation, and the differing accounts of the extent of PKI resistance 
during the military operation (from individuals' personal experiences). Finally, I 
examine the theme of betrayal and how it relates to South Blitar.
Oral historian Alessandro Portelli sketched out, in an essay on the Italian 
Resistance during World War II, the difficulties some partisans had with 
acknowledging the use of violence by the partisans themselves, whether it was 
violence directed against those accused of being traitors or against Fascists.6 The 
Resistance movement's image in Italy was as a peaceful and just movement fighting 
for democratic ideals.7 In a similar way, some former Indonesian political prisoners, 
particularly those who had not been part of the South Blitar base, found it difficult to 
accept that there might have been violent acts of resistance, however minor, carried out 
by leftists in South Blitar. Likewise, among those who fled to South Blitar, there are 
many different versions about what actually occurred there. In this article, I explore the 
reasons for those differences and how the New Order version of history has influenced 
former political prisoners' interpretations about events at the South Blitar base.
New Order Version and Historiography
The PKI was subjected to elaborate mythmaking during the New Order regime, 
connected with the army's anti-communist propaganda campaign, in which it blamed 
the PKI for the killing of seven army officers at Lubang Buaya on September 30, 1965. 
Elements of these myths have endured.8 Mass leftist organizations, such as Gerwani
5 Anonymous, 30 tahun Indonesia merdeka (Jakarta: Tira Pustaka, 1981), pp. 182-83.
6 Alessandro Portelli, The Battle o f Valle Giulia: Oral History and the Art o f  Dialogue (Madison, WI: University 
of Wisconsin Press, 1997); in particular, see the essay "The Battle of Poggio Bustone: Violence, Memory, 
and Imagination in the Partisan War," pp. 126-39.
7 Ibid., p. 127.
8 See Saskia E. Wieringa, "Sexual Slander and the 1965-66 Mass Killings in Indonesia: Some Political and 
Methodological Considerations," Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, Working 
Paper Series No. 125, November 2009, pp. 3-7, which examines how anti-Gerwani sentiments continue to 
mark public life in Indonesia even after the resignation of President Suharto in May 1998.
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(Gerakan Wanita Indonesia, Indonesian Women's Movement), the trade-union 
federation's All-Indonesia Trade Union Centre (Sentra Organisasi Buruh Seluruh 
Indonesia, SOBSI), and the cultural organization Lekra were also targeted. Key aspects 
of this propaganda campaign were rumors that Gerwani women had sexually tortured 
and mutilated the generals' bodies,9 and accusations that the communists were atheists 
and had tried to overthrow the state. In this atmosphere, and with tension heightened 
by the curfews, media censorship, and other repressive orders at the beginning of 
October 1965, it became possible to alienate large sections of the Indonesian people 
from the PKI, and to justify the post-September 30 massacre and purges carried out 
against party members and sympathizers.
There are few official documents recording the 1965-66 killings and details about 
the victims. In contrast, the military and government documented carefully the results 
of the Trisula operation (June-September 1968). One year after the operation ended, 
the Brawijaya Division produced a commemorative volume10 and commissioned a 
documentary film, using footage shot during the operation.11 The story woven by army 
historians about the South Blitar episode, through military histories, monuments, and 
textbooks, was an important part of the regime's consolidation process. In order to 
consolidate, it was vital to neutralize any remaining support for President Sukarno 
within the military and in sections of the Indonesian Nationalist Party (Partai Nasional 
Indonesia, PNI). The new regime could not have governed effectively without first 
defeating politically these Sukarnoist forces. At the time of the Brawijaya book's 
publication, the military, including the Brawijaya Division itself, was riven with 
divisions. The rifts were between those who continued to support Sukarno and those 
who aligned themselves with the ascendant groups supporting Suharto. The book 
emphasizes the numbers and names of military officers and soldiers arrested in 
connection with supporting PKI-linked fugitives, suggesting that the authors set out to 
document the erosion of the network of pro-Sukarno soldiers.12 Understood in its 
historical context, this book was to celebrate the victory of the military over the PKI, 
but it was also very much a part of the arsenal in the New Order regime's 
consolidation, which was still underway when the book was published in late 1969. 
The volume was fast-tracked for publication on October 1, 1969, to mark the four-year 
anniversary of the coup attempt. The relatively disjointed and, in some parts, repetitive 
nature of the book suggest that it was compiled from a variety of documents written by 
different authors. It reads, in parts, like a field manual or a series of reports. Due to the 
dearth of alternative sources, but also because of its detailed maps and accounts of 
various elements of the operation, this army volume has remained an influential 
history of the Trisula operation. The Armed Forces History Centre's four-volume work 
on "the latent danger of communism" situates the South Blitar episode as part of a
9 Robert Cribb, The Indonesian Killings o f 1965-1966: Studies from Java and Bali (Clayton: Centre for Southeast 
Asian Studies, Monash University, 1990), p. 29.
10 Semdam VIII Brawidjaja, Operasi Trisula Kodam VIII Brawidjaja (Surabaya: Jajasan Taman 
Tjandrawilwatikta, 1969).
11 "Perpustakaan Museum Brawijaya, Tempat Menyimpan Dokumen Sejarah Militer," Jawa Pos, February 
20, 2008, Radar Malang section, p. 1. Also, author's discussion with library and documentation section 
head, Major Henry Handoko, Museum Brawijaya, in Malang, February 20, 2008. He indicated that this 
film was being used as educational material for soldiers in 2008 to warn of the dangers of communism.
12 Ibid., p. 5. It is pointed out here that the South Blitar base had attracted many military deserters.
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series of communist resurgence attempts and reproduces descriptions of South Blitar 
and the Trisula operation, including maps and photos, from the Brawijaya text.13 Army 
accounts of the operation painted a picture of communists infiltrating a poor, isolated 
region that had, as the army account conceded, been historically sympathetic to the 
left.14
Other sources about South Blitar and the Trisula operation are military and 
organizational (auto)biographies, often written many years after 1968. During the New 
Order regime, military biographies often reflected the need to mark one's role in anti­
communist operations, in particular because of the divisions within the military 
between those who continued to support Sukarno and those who aligned themselves 
with the New Order. The Trisula operation was an important milestone in early New 
Order rule, particularly in East Java. Therefore, as the Brawijaya Division commander 
who presided over the operation, Muhammad Jasin devoted a section of his 
autobiography to it15 and to the prestige that its success brought to him and Witarmin, 
the Trisula field commander.16 Agus Sunyoto's history of the Ansor Youth Movement's 
paramilitary organization, Banser (Barisan Serbaguna, Multipurpose Force), and its 
"holy war" (jihad) against the PKI, discusses their activities in South Blitar.17 Sunyoto's 
work, published during the New Order period, showed that Banser members were 
primarily acting as hansip (civilian defense guards) alongside the military in South 
Blitar.18 Indonesian media reporting of the 1966-68 period was remarkably uniform. 
Sources tended to be confined to those sanctioned by the government, such as the 
official news agency Antara and military-sponsored newspapers such as Berita Yudha 
and Angkatan Bersenjata.19 Non-military media outlets, such as the magazine Skets Masa, 
in East Java, took a radically different stance once Sukarno was deposed, and began 
reporting on PKI attempts to revive itself and on the army's military triumphs, similar 
to the military-sponsored newspapers' reporting.20
Scholarly literature on the 1968 South Blitar episode was marked by Cold War anti­
communist sentiments and was usually part of an overall analysis of Indonesia after 
the PKI had been dismantled. Justus van der Kroef and Arnold Brackman, for example, 
saw the 1968 South Blitar episode as part of communist attempts to regroup across the
13 Markas Besar Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Bahaya Laten Komunisme di Indonesia (Jakarta: 
Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, 1995), vol. 5, pp. 83-107.
14 Semdam VIII Brawidjaja, Operasi Trisula Kodam VIII Bmwidjaja, p. 30. In this account, it was noted that 
the South Blitar area had delivered 85 percent of the vote to the PKI in the 1955 elections.
15 M. Jasin, "Saya Tidak Pernah Minta Ampun Kepada Soeharto"—Sebuah Memoar (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar 
Harapan, 1998), pp. 66-95. Jasin later became critical of Suharto and the New Order's "excesses."
16 Witarmin was promoted to become head of Kopassandha, the precursor to Kopassus (Komando 
Pasukan Khusus, Special Forces Command) of the Indonesian Armed Forces. Harsja W. Bachtiar, Siapa dia? 
Perwira tinggi Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat (TNI-AD) (Jakarta: Djambatan, 1988), p. 467.
17 Agus Sunyoto et al., Banser Berjihad Menumpas PKI (Tulungagung: Lembaga Kajian dan Pengembangan 
PW GP Ansor Jawa Timur & Pesulukan Thoriqoh Agung, 1996), pp. 161-80.
18 Sunyoto et al., Banser Berjihad Menumpas PKI, pp. 170-72. Banser members also acted as spies prior to the 
operation.
19 Roger K. Paget, "Djakarta Newspapers, 1965-1967: Preliminary Comments," Indonesia 4 (October 1967): 
211-26. Paget provides a survey of newspapers that were still publishing in the post-coup-attempt period.
20 Skets Masa's coverage of the military's pursuit of the PKI throughout Java culminated with the Trisula 
operation in South Blitar, and Grip publishers issued a "special edition" book based on that coverage. See: 
Skets Masa editorial team, Operasi Trisula, Brawidjaja Menghantjurkan PKI-Gaja Baru (Surabaya: Grip, 1968).
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archipelago.21 For van der Kroef, the evidence for this was the series of "security 
disturbances" across many islands in Indonesia that marked the period following the 
1965-66 mass killings up to 1968. By 1971, however, van der Kroef had shifted his 
position and concluded that the New Order regime cultivated rumors of alleged 
communist revival to consolidate its power and maintain the raft of "informal and 
extra-constitutional social and political controls exercised for years now by the armed 
forces throughout the country."22 Van der Kroef acknowledged the problems for 
analysts in the late 1960s of having to rely on military sources, pointing out that 
rumors of new PKI plots had become common currency.23 In fact, by 1971, it had 
become clear that the PKI was a spent political force in Indonesia, due to the arrests 
and killings of its militants.24 Many years later, Robert Cribb cautioned against 
accepting that the communist "bases" represented a critical threat to the regime, 
arguing that all the PKI "resistance" attempts, including those in Blitar and West 
Kalimantan, taken together did not constitute a civil war.25 Cribb also pointed to the 
passivity with which most victims of the killings in 1965-66 went to their deaths.261 
examine additions to the literature on South Blitar in the post-Suharto period in the 
section below.
Emerging Literature
After President Suharto's resignation in May 1998, limited debates reappeared 
about the events of September 30, 1965, and the following few days. A key issue has 
been to establish accountability for the murder of the generals and for the PKI's 
involvement in the Thirtieth of September Movement (Gerakan 30 September, G30S). 
There has also been a move to document the experiences of former political prisoners 
and to campaign for recognition of the human-rights abuses inflicted on those 
prisoners. Historical revision, or providing accounts that differ from those of the New 
Order regime, can be broadly divided into three strands: those that concentrate on the 
coup attempt itself,27 on the general manipulation of Indonesian historiography under 
Suharto, and on literature dealing with the mass killings and imprisonment. In his 
recent contribution to literature on the coup attempt, John Roosa, for example, argued 
that the Special Bureau, an internal party unit answerable to Chairman DN Aidit and 
responsible for "handling" military officers who were members or sympathizers of the
21 See Justus M. van der Kroef, Indonesia since Sukarno (Singapore: D. Moore for Asia Pacific Press, 1971); 
and Arnold C. Brackman, The Communist Collapse in Indonesia (New York, NY: Norton, 1969).
22 Van der Kroef, Indonesia since Sukarno, p. 124.
23 Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesian Communism since the 1965 Coup," Pacific Affairs 43,1 (Spring 
1970): 35.
24 Van der Kroef writes: "Yet underground PKI operations are not so extensive at the moment as to 
constitute a real threat to the Government, whether in the capital or the outlying provinces." See van der 
Kroef, Indonesia since Sukarno, p. 124.
25 Cribb, The Indonesian Killings o f 1965-1966, p. 34.
26 Ibid., p. 34.
27 For example, see Baskara T. Wardaya, Membongkar Supersemar: Dari CIA Hingga Kudeta Merangkak 
melawan Bung Kamo (Yogyakarta: Galangpress, 2007); and Harsutejo, G30S, Sejarah yang Digelapkan: Tangan 
berdarah CIA dan Rejim (Jakarta: Hasta Mitra, 2003).
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PKI, did have links with the Thirtieth of September Movement.28 The government's 
banning of the Indonesian translation of Roosa's book in 2009,29 taken together with the 
2007 ban on history textbooks that omitted associating the PKI with the Thirtieth of 
September Movement, are signs of this topic's continuing sensitivity within the 
Indonesian government. A number of books published in the last ten years remain 
wedded to the New Order regime's version of events, or at least seek to warn of the 
dangers of communism, a central theme of the New Order.30
A second strand of the emerging literature focuses on the manipulation of 
Indonesian historiography under Suharto.31 One of the main contributors to this broad 
critical reappraisal of Indonesian historiography is Asvi Warman Adam, a historian at 
the Indonesian Institute of Social Sciences (LIPI, Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan 
Indonesia).32 The third strand of recent literature focuses on the aftermath of the 
Thirtieth of September Movement, especially the mass killings and imprisonments,33 
and includes memoirs and oral histories, some by political prisoners.34 A common 
theme in this particular literature is to highlight the need for post-dictatorship 
accountability and the restitution of the rights of political prisoners. The National 
Human Rights Commission began investigating the 1965 human-rights abuses 
systematically throughout the archipelago in August 2008. Those who were 
imprisoned or whose family members perished in the 1965-66 killings seek state 
recognition of the abuses committed against them and their relatives. Survivors' 
groups, specific to the 1965 killings, as well as groups that raise awareness about other 
abuses under the New Order regime, have developed since 1998. Former public
28 John Roosa's book Pretext for Mass Murder (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006) can be 
seen as part of the post-Suharto debates, reexamining the 1965 events. An Indonesian translation of this 
work, titled Dalih Pembunuhan Massal, was banned by the Indonesian Attorney General's office in 2009.
29 "Rights body wants AGO to clarify ban," The Jakarta Post, December 30, 2009.
30 See Firos Fauzan, Pengkhianatan Partai Komunis Indonesia: Hari Duka Nasional 1 Oktober 1965 (Jakarta: 
Bhuana Ilmu Populer, 2009); Aco Manafe, Teperpu mengungkap pengkhianatan PKI pada tahun 1965 dan proses 
hukum bagi para pelakunya (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Flarapan, 2007); and Aminuddin Kasdi and G. Ambar 
Wulan, G.30.S. PKI/196: Bedah ceasar Dewan Revolusi Indonesia (Surabaya: Java Pustaka Media Utama, 2005).
31 See Bambang Purwanto and Asvi Warman Adam, Menggugat Historiografi Indonesia (Yogyakarta: Ombak, 
2005); and Asvi Warman Adam, Membongkar Manipulasi Sejarah: Kontroversi Pelaku dan Peristiwa (Jakarta: 
Penerbit Buku Kompas, 2009).
32 An indication of the contentious and, in turn, contested nature of reexamining Indonesian 
historiography was the demonstrations against Asvi Warman Adam on March 29, 2007, by anti­
communist groups who demanded his sacking for being "pro-communist." See "LIPI Didemo 300 Orang 
Anti Komunis, April 4, 2007," Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, www.antara.co.id/arc/2007/ 3/28/ 
lipi-didemo-300-orang-anti-komunis, accessed March 17, 2010.
33 John Roosa, Ayu Ratih, and Flilmar Farid, ed., Tahun yang Tak Pernah Berakhir: Memahami Pengalaman 
Korban 65, Esai-esai sejarah lisan (Jakarta: Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Masyarakat, 2004).
34 For a preliminary examination of this genre of 1965 memoirs, see Vannessa Hearman, "The Uses of 
Memoirs and Oral History Works in Researching the 1965-66 Political Violence in Indonesia," International 
Journal o f Asia-Pacific Studies 5,2 (2009): 21-42. Individual biographies are, for example, Sulami, Perempuan 
Kebenaran Penjara (Jakarta: Cipta Karya, 1999); Sudjinah, Terempas Gelombang Pasang: Riwayat Wartawati 
dalam Penjara Orde Baru (Jakarta: Pustaka Utan Kayu, 2003); and Achmadi Moestahal, Dari Gontor ke Pulau 
Burn (Yogyakarta: Syarikat, 2002). Oral-history collections about survivors include Francisca Ria Susanti, 
Kembang-kembang Genjer ([place of publication unknown], Lembaga Sastra Pembebasan, 2006); and Hersri 
Setiawan, Kidung Untuk Korban: Dari Tutur Sepuluh Narasumber Eks-Tapol (Solo: Pakorba and Pustaka 
Pelajar, 2006). There are also memoirs that remain unpublished whose authors have died, such as 
Sumiyarsi Siwirini, "Plantungan: Pembuangan Tapol Perempuan," unpublished manuscript, provided to 
the author by manuscript editor, Harsono Sutejo, via email, May 24, 2007.
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servants who were imprisoned in the 1960s, for example, have set up a group in Solo to 
demand that their right to a pension be recognized.35 The widespread institutionalized 
discrimination against former political prisoners and their families under Suharto, 
which lasted for over three decades, means that there are scores of people now seeking 
some form of redress and for whom reconciliation is important.
Studies of South Blitar represent a relatively small part of this exercise in historical 
reexamination. The lack of new significant scholarship on South Blitar is partly due to 
the fact that the Trisula operation marked the end of the PKI and the beginning of a 
long period of New Order rule. For former political prisoners, what took place in South 
Blitar could be problematic in showing that some leftists had tried to fight back against 
the Suharto-led repression by regrouping in South Blitar to reorganize the party. 
Herein lies the importance of challenging the South Blitar historiography and making 
it a part of reexamining the anti-PKI repression as a whole. It is impossible to look at 
PKI attempts to regroup in isolation from the broader context of the scale of repression 
against party members and sympathizers. There have been limited attempts by 
organizations in Blitar and in Jakarta to document people's experiences in 1968. 
Members of Lakpesdam NU36 in Blitar have conducted interviews about the 1960s and 
built a network of contacts in the villages of South Blitar. Lakpesdam NU held a 
cultural event at the Trisula Monument in 2004 to bring together locals, former political 
prisoners, and NU followers, as an early attempt at grassroots reconciliation to 
overcome the legacy of violence and stigmatization against the South Blitar 
community.37 In this work, they are, however, somewhat hampered by their 
association with Nahdlatul Ulama (NU, Awakening of Religious Scholars). For former 
political prisoners and South Blitar villagers, NU was linked with the 1965-66 killings 
through the paramilitary group Banser's participation in those killings and the active 
support of many NU religious leaders, or kiai, for the killings. During the Trisula 
operation, NU, the Ansor Youth Movement, and Banser actively assisted the military.38 
Within NU in East Java, some leaders oppose working with former political prisoners 
on the basis of fears that the Left could rise again, thus posing difficulties for the young 
Lakpesdam activists who have been involved in attempting to foster reconciliation and 
working to document the experiences of South Blitar villagers during the Trisula 
Operation.39 As far as I am aware, Lakpesdam Blitar has neither published the
35 Forum Komunikasi Korban G30S (30th September Movement Victims' Communication Forum), Solo. 
Iskandar, interview, Solo, May 3, 2007. Due to their imprisonment, these public servants have been 
considered ineligible for the public-service pension.
36 Founded in 1985, Lakpesdam NU (Lembaga Kajian dan Pengembangan Sumber Daya Manusia, Institute 
for Research and Human Resources Development) is a human-resources development arm of Indonesia's 
largest Muslim organization, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), and a non-government organization engaged in 
research and publication (www.lakpesdam.or.id). Lakpesdam NU held a cultural event at the Trisula 
Monument in 2004 to bring together locals, former political prisoners, and NU followers, as an early 
attempt at grassroots reconciliation to overcome the legacy of violence and stigmatization against the 
South Blitar community.
37 Budiawan, Mematahkan pewarisan ingatan: wacana anti-komunis dan politik rekonsiliasi pasca-Soeharto, 
(Jakarta: Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Masyarakat, 2004), pp. 212-19.
38 Sunyoto et al., Banser Berjihad Menumpas PKI, p 171.
39 Aula magazine, published by NU in East Java, had a special issue dedicated to warning of PKI 
resurgence and the brainwashing of particular NU activists by leftists. Aula, Special Theme: Awas PKI, 
May 2008. On the work of Syarikat, a non-government organization in which many NU activists are 
involved, which aims to foster reconciliation between NU and former political prisoners, see Katharine E.
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interviews it has collected, nor any analysis of the material. The Indonesian Social 
History Institute (Institut Sejarah Sosial Indonesia, ISSI), based in Jakarta, conducted 
seventeen interviews in the South Blitar area as part of a larger oral-history project in 
Indonesia. An essay by Andre Liem, the main interviewer in South Blitar, shows that 
South Blitar was not a clear-cut case of meaningful armed resistance against the New 
Order.40 The collection of interviews represents an important source in understanding 
more deeply the experiences of local people during this time, as well as the social and 
political history of the area prior to the 1960s. In this article, I set out to broaden our 
understanding about South Blitar and the lived experience of the Trisula operation 
beyond the limited material that has hitherto been available.
Methodology and Interviewees
My analysis draws on a combination of primary data, including interviews 
conducted in 2007, 2008, and 2009; military accounts; media reports from late 1965 
onward; and court (trial) documents. I conducted interviews with villagers in South 
Blitar and former political prisoners. I also draw on the interview material collected by 
ISSI and Lakpesdam NU in Blitar. Members of the latter introduced me to some of the 
interviewees who provided information for this article. The material from Lakpesdam 
NU consists of interviews conducted in 2005 with four women who have lived in the 
South Blitar area all of their lives. In addition, this organization also facilitated an 
interview with Hasyim Asyhari, a former member of the Nahdlatul Ulama's Ansor 
Youth Movement who took part in anti-PKI operations in South Blitar, who became 
embittered at his treatment under the Suharto regime.41
The six main informants whom I interviewed are all former political prisoners from 
outside the South Blitar area. They include Rewang, a member of the PKI's newly (in 
1966) constituted Politburo, and those who were not party members, such as Lies Sari, 
a journalist who wrote for a national economic weekly. While obvious to many, it 
should nevertheless be stated here that those who were arrested in South Blitar served 
long prison sentences.
Rewang was born in Solo in 1928. He joined the PKI in the late 1940s and was 
active in Central Java in the Indonesian Peasants' Union (Barisan Tani Indonesia, BTI). 
In 1965, he became a member of the PKI Politburo and the secretary of the Central 
Committee. He was arrested in South Blitar, went to trial in 1971 for attempting to 
overthrow the government and resurrecting the PKI, and was convicted and sentenced 
to life imprisonment. He was released from prison in 1991. He lives in Solo, Central 
Java.42
Lestari was born in 1930, in Bojonegoro. She was an activist in Gerwani and the 
trade-union federation, SOBSI. Before her arrest, she lived in Surabaya. She was
McGregor, "Confronting the Past in Contemporary Indonesia: The Anti-Communist Killings of 1965-66 
and the Role of the Nahdlatul Ulama," Critical Asian Studies 41,2 (2009): 195-224.
40 Interviews held by the Indonesian Social History Institute, Jakarta, consulted by the author in July 2007. 
Andre Liem, "Perjuangan Bersenjata PKI di Blitar Selatan dan Operasi Trisula," in Tahun yang Tak Pernah 
Berakhir, ed. John Roosa et al., pp. 163-200.
41 Hasyim Asyhari, interviewed by the author, South Blitar, February 10, 2009.
42 Rewang, interviewed by the author, Solo, February 14, 2009.
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married to Suwandi, the secretary of the PKI provincial committee for East Java, who, 
after his capture in South Blitar, was forced to cooperate with the military. Lestari 
served eleven years in prison, mostly in the Malang Women's Prison. She lives in 
Jakarta.43
Putmainah, born in 1927, was a PKI member of parliament for Blitar. Her family 
has a long history in the Blitar region, with her father being involved in Sarekat Islam 
in the area. She was a Gerwani leader at the local level and was active in running the 
Jasmin Kindergarten (Taman Kanak-kanak Melati) network that Gerwani organized. 
Her husband, Soebandi, was shot dead during the Trisula operation. Putmainah served 
ten years in prison, mostly in Plantungan Women's Prison in Central Java; she was 
released in 1978. She lives near Blitar.44
M. Winata (a pseudonym) was born in 1935. A PKI member since his high school 
days, he is from a district in East Java near Blitar. He trained overseas to become an 
engineer and was a senior public servant in the Directorate of Mining before being 
arrested and jailed in Salemba Prison, in Jakarta, for a year. After his release, in 1966, 
he returned to East Java. After several months, he feared for his safety in his village 
and made his way to South Blitar. He was arrested again in 1968 during the Trisula 
operation and tried in 1977 for his involvement in the South Blitar case, after having 
already served nine years in jail. Upon conviction, he was sentenced to an additional 
nineteen years in prison. He was finally released in 1990.45
Tuti (a pseudonym) was born in 1925 and became the head of Gerwani's Surabaya- 
based East Java provincial committee. Together with Winata, she was tried in 1977 for 
violent attacks against the state in the aftermath of the Trisula operation. She was 
sentenced to seventeen years in jail, served this sentence mainly in the Malang 
Women's Prison, and was released from prison in November 1988. I interviewed her 
near Surabaya.46
Lies Sari had been a Jakarta-based journalist prior to her arrest. She also uses the 
names Sri Soelistyowati and is sometimes known as Lies Katno, through her marriage 
to Sukatno, Pemuda Rakyat (People's Youth) chairperson. Sukatno was a member of 
parliament in 1965. After his arrest in connection with the South Blitar case, he was 
sentenced to death in 1968. He died in 1997 while on death row.47 Lies Sari lives in 
Jakarta.48
In preparing this article, I analyzed the military publications and biographies 
discussed earlier, as well as an unpublished manuscript written by Lies Sari, 
Muhammad Munir's defense speech delivered at trial, and media reports from the 
1980s on the execution of some South Blitar detainees. I visited the Trisula Monument
43 Lestari, interviewed by the author, Jakarta April 26, 2007.
44 Putmainah, interviews with the author, Blitar, May 11, 2007, and March 1, 2008.
45 M. Winata, interviewed by the author, East Java, February 22, 2008.
46 Tuti, interviewed by the author, Surabaya, August 2, 2007, and February 16, 2008.
47 Then-Timorese resistance leader Jose Alexandre "Xanana" Gusmao, who was also imprisoned at the 
time, made a special appeal for Sukatno's release after witnessing Sukatno's ill health in prison. "Sukatno 
Dies after 30 Years in Prison/' TAPOL, May 8,1997, www.xs4all.nl/ -peace/arc/arceng/ state/ims.html 
(accessed February 16, 2010).
48 Lies Sari, interviewed by the author, Jakarta, January 31, 2009.
72 Vannessa Hearman
in Bakung to view the way this period was represented by the regime—as a 
harmonious collaboration between local South Blitar villagers and the military. I also 
visited the Brawijaya Museum, in Malang, to examine how this military institution 
showcased the Trisula operation to museum audiences. I found displayed there several 
unpublished photographs from the operation, such as pictures of the arrest and 
interrogation of key PKI leader Suwandi, and photos from the celebratory ceremonies 
commemorating the killing of PKI leader Oloan Hutapea. From this research, this 
article aims to provide a more detailed discussion of the South Blitar period of the 
party's history than has hitherto been available.
The Impetus to Flee the Cities of Java
Many key PKI leaders, such as Aidit, Sakirman, Lukman, and Nyoto, had been 
killed or arrested by the end of 1965. Then, the arrest of PKI Politburo member 
Sudisman in December 1966 was another significant blow and indicated that the PKI's 
next layer of leadership was coming under threat.49 At the time, there were two main 
PKI branches: one led by Sudisman, a member of the Politburo in Jakarta, and the 
other clustered around Ismail Bakri, in Bandung, which Rewang supported.50 Rewang 
was the chairperson of the Central Java PKI provincial committee and a secretary and 
candidate member of the Central Committee. A section of the surviving party 
leadership had become critical of the PKI's previous emphasis on pursuing a legal, 
parliamentary path and entrusting its fate and that of its membership to president 
Sukarno and other non-communists, a policy for which the party was now paying the 
price.51 After the arrest of Sudisman in December 1966, there were only two members 
left of the original Politburo. "Second echelon" leaders of the PKI and its affiliated 
organizations, such as Oloan Hutapea, Munir, Sukatno, and Tjugito, became 
increasingly drawn to Rewang's group.52 Ruslan Wijayasastra became the chairperson 
of the "emergency" Central Committee.53
Due to the indiscriminate killings of PKI members after October 1965, an urgent 
task was to save the lives of party cadres, if the party were to survive in the future, but
49 Liem, "Perjuangan Bersenjata PKI di Blitar Selatan dan Operasi Trisula," p. 174.
50 According to Soedjono, Sudisman's grouping still supported Aidit's ideas whereas Ismail Bakri's group 
was critical of this line and that leadership's closeness to Sukarno. Imam Soedjono, Yang Berlawan: 
Membongkar Tahir Pemalsuan Sejarah PKI (Yogyakarta: Resist Books and Yayasan Sapu Lidi, 2006), p. 323.
51 According to Imam Soedjono, Yang Berlawan, pp. 323-24, this criticism was mostly voiced by the Ismail 
Bakri group, though Sudisman later agreed to the issuing of the Self-Criticism document (Tegakkan PKI 
yang Marxis Leninis untuk memimpin revolusi demokrasi rakyat Indonesia—Otokritik Politbiro CC PKI, 
September 1966).
52 Van der Kroef, "Indonesian Communism since the 1965 Coup," pp. 34-60. Oloan Hutapea was editor of 
Bintang Merah (Red Star), the PKI's theoretical journal; Munir was secretary general of the trade union 
federation, SOBSI; Sukatno was a People's Youth leader; and Tjugito was a PKI Central Committee 
member. These men were members of the PKI "emergency" Central Committee and were captured in 
South Blitar in 1968.
53 Rewang, interviewed by the author. The emergency Central Committee was formed after Sudisman's 
arrest in December 1966. For a detailed composition of the Politburo and Central Committee, see Imam 
Soedjono, Yang Berlawan, p. 325.
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this was becoming a difficult task in the cities.54 The official banning of communism in 
1966 provided justification for many members of the PKI and leftist organizations to 
run or hide. Hiding even in large cities, such as Surabaya, was not a long-term 
solution. As a result, those in hiding or on the run opted for a tactical retreat to isolated 
parts of Java. As the highest-ranking surviving leader responsible for establishing a 
remote base, Rewang explained the motivations for retreating to South Blitar:
Our departure to South Blitar was based on the view that there was no longer 
any legal guarantee for communists. The possibility for peaceful struggle had 
disappeared. We needed to take up armed resistance, so we decided to relocate 
the party leadership to South Blitar.55
Several people whom I interviewed noted that the hardships they experienced 
while living on the run or trying to hide in Jakarta were part of the motivation for 
retreating to South Blitar. Tuti, formerly a Gerwani leader from East Java, was on the 
run and worked as a courier to maintain communication with and between party 
leaders and members. Over time, Tuti had difficulties finding shelter and food for 
herself, let alone for those whom she was in charge of protecting. Putmainah, a 
Gerwani leader in Blitar and a parliamentary member prior to the 1965 coup attempt, 
had seven children to support while on the run. She rented a series of houses for brief 
periods, moving on quickly without ever getting settled.56 PKI members were not the 
only ones being sought by the authorities. The split in the Indonesian Nationalist Party 
(Partai Nasional Indonesia, PNI) in 1965 had created two opposing camps: those 
aligned with Ali Sastroamidjojo and Surachman, and those favoring Osa Maliki.57 
Members of the Ali faction, and Surachman himself, were in South Blitar because they 
were being targeted in the purges, which had by late 1966 widened to threaten pro- 
Sukarno forces. By 1966, the PKI was suffering from the purges and its formal 
structures had largely ceased functioning. The question of whether the party could 
mount a comeback seemed secondary to that of survival.
The government did not anticipate that South Blitar, perceived as a quiet 
backwater, represented a potential source of PKI resistance. South Blitar's reputation 
for inactivity was in contrast to the reputations of other party bases, such as Klaten, in 
Central Java, where many actions, such as land seizures by the Indonesian Peasants' 
Union, had occurred prior to October 1965.58 The party assigned the East Java branch to 
investigate and assess the area around South Blitar as a possible hiding place and a 
base from which to regroup. The reasons for considering South Blitar were the area's 
isolation, the relatively minor purges there in 1965-66, and the area's historical support 
for the PKI and leftist mass organizations. Moreover, South Blitar was not the only area 
that housed political fugitives. Additional "projects" or bases were established in East
54 Rewang, cited in Andre Liem, "Perjuangan Bersenjata PKI di Blitar Selatan dan Operasi Trisula," in 
Tahun yang tak pernah berakhir, ed. John Roosa et a t, p. 174. Original text in Indonesian; translation by the 
author.
55 Rewang, interviewed by the author.
56 Putmainah, interviewed by the author, March 1, 2008.
57 Angus McIntyre, "Divisions and Power in the Indonesian National Party, 1965-1966," Indonesia 13 (April 
1972): 183-210.
58 Rewang, interviewed by the author.
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Java, in varying stages of development, mainly in the mountainous areas around 
Mounts Semeru, Lawu, Raung, Argopuro, and Kelud, as well as in South Malang.59
The fugitives had been hiding in South Blitar for between one and one-and-a-half 
years before the Trisula operation, in which five thousand soldiers and three thousand 
"militias and vigilantes" auxiliaries were deployed.60 The most intense period of the 
operation was from June to July 1968, and it officially ended on September 7,1968. The 
operation destroyed the fugitives' base and, according to the New York Times, around 
one thousand "party members" were captured or killed.61 Many Trisula detainees were 
photographed and the photographs published in the Brawijaya commemoration book 
(with a list of those arrested) or displayed in the Brawijaya Museum, in Malang. These 
records confirm that those arrested included PKI central and regional leaders, and 
Gerwani's leaders. Those who fled to South Blitar to escape political persecution 
included party organizers, students, former soldiers, military officers, and trade union 
leaders.62 In this, we can see how wide the regime's net was, ensnaring people who 
were only loosely united under the umbrella of leftist organizations, who in some cases 
were not even PKI members.
Life in South Blitar before Trisula
Many fugitives found South Blitar quite remarkable. Lestari explained:
In those days, you could count the houses with tiled roofs. To have a chair inside 
the house was very rare. What you would find was just one big divan, for the 
whole household to sit and sleep on.63
To reach South Blitar, Rewang traveled by public transportation (a combination of 
train and buses) at the beginning of 1967, when the base was first being established. In 
the course of their journeys to South Blitar, many fugitives had to travel across Kediri 
District, a stronghold of the Lirboyo Pesantren (a religious boarding school). Led by 
Kiai Haji Machrus Ali, this pesantren was a key force in suppressing the PKI in the 
Kediri region, where thousands were killed during the period 1965-66.64 Interviewees 
recalled their trepidation about being in Kediri. Putmainah, who originated from the 
northern reaches of Blitar district, arrived in South Blitar via Surabaya. A courier in 
Surabaya told her she should head for South Blitar for refuge. Putmainah's husband, 
Subandi, was part of the base's leadership. Putmainah did not use the most direct
59 Semdam VIII Brawidjaja, Operasi Trisula Kodam VIII Brawidjaja, p. 5. The areas the military identified 
concurred with those identified by Rewang.
60 "Reds Renew Campaign in Indonesia," New York Times, August 11,1968.
61 Philip Shabecoff, "Indonesia is Still Purging Reds Three Years after Failure of Coup," New York Times, 
February 13,1968. The figures used were likely supplied by the army.
62 Semdam VIII Brawidjaja, Operasi Trisula Kodam VIII Brawidjaja, pp. 289-310.
63 Lestari, interviewed by the author.
64 The roles of Kiai Haji Machrus Ali and the Lirboyo Pesantren are discussed in Hermawan Sulistyo, Palu 
Arit di Ladang Tebu: Sejarah Pembantaian Massal yang Terlupakan (Jombang-Kediri, 1965-1966) (Jakarta: 
Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia, 2000), p. 166; and Sari Emingahayu, "Pergolakan Politik 1965-66 di 
Kediri," in Sisi senyap politik bising, ed. A. Budi Susanto (Jakarta: Kanisius, 2007), pp. 88-89. Also see Tiga 
Tokoh Lirboyo (Kediri: Badan Pembina Kesejahteraan Pondok Pesantren Lirboyo, 2002), pp. 85-87, which 
presents a sanitized account of the anti-PKl operations in Kediri, but also shows the influential role of 
Machrus Ali in galvanizing support for the operations.
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route, but took unexpected routes to avoid drawing attention to herself. She recalled 
that, while riding in a horse cart (dokar) on her way southward, she drew down her 
conical hat over her face to avoid being noticed as they passed by Pondok Tenggong, a 
pesantren in Kediri district. Many fugitives made their way to South Blitar in a 
roundabout way, using a combination of train travel followed by rides in trucks or 
carts across the southern countryside.
Fugitives usually lived with local families or found some housing nearby; they 
rarely lived in the forests as guerrillas,65 as was often portrayed. Moreover, many PKI 
members and sympathizers integrated (berbaur) into the local population. Their daily 
activities, mirroring those of their hosts, included working on farms, collecting 
firewood and water, and helping with other household chores, "even washing the 
bottoms of their [hosts'] children if required."66 Interviewees were anxious to show that 
they "fitted in" with their hosts and were not a burden. Lestari gave several examples 
of how they attempted to assimilate, for example, by eating the same kind of food:
What was most important was that we adapted, so that we all became one. So we 
really dived in, tried to understand their lives. At that time the people were still 
very primitive. They did not even know what a [kerosene] stove was. We were 
accepted by the people, so there was no difficulty, so long as we could adapt to 
the local people, be together with them, for example, by having to eat cassava 
meal [tiwul], their kind of food.67
Lies Sari lived in South Blitar for a year, while trying to reunite with her husband, 
Sukatno, who was in South Malang, an adjacent area.68 As distinct from what she told 
me about how she came to be in South Blitar, Lies Sari stated in an interview with VHR 
Media in 2008 that she was a member of the Ali-Surachman wing of the PNI, and that 
she had been arrested along with a pharmacology student from Bandung while they 
were engaged in a study about the natural resources of the south coast of Java.69 She is 
most likely the only former South Blitar detainee to have written an account of her time 
in the area. Her work is a semi-ethnographic study of a community in Pasiraman 
village, containing accounts about local spiritual beliefs and rites, as well as her work 
as a midwife's assistant.70 Her writings also contain a strong emphasis, also conveyed 
in interviews (and shared by military and government sources cited earlier), on the 
"primitiveness" of the people in South Blitar. She explained that the people were 
animists and had their own style of dress, which was less modest than she and other 
townsfolk would normally countenance. The villagers only grew a limited range of 
food crops and had little knowledge about the use of organic fertilizers, such as
65 Muyatno, interviewed by Andre Liem, Indonesian Institute of Social History, Jakarta, transcript and 
recording accessed by author on July 30, 2007.
66 Winata, interviewed by the author.
67 Lestari, interviewed by the author.
68 Lies Sari, interviewed by the author.
69 Yulianti, "Kejamnya Rezim Suharto (4), Diinjak, Kemaluanku Berdarah," VHR (Voice of Human Rights) 
Media, January 31, 2008, www.vhrmedia.com/vhr-story/lakon,Kejamnya-Rezim-Soeharto-(4)-21.html. 
Accessed February 16, 2010.
70 Lies Sari, "Blitar Selatan yang dilupakan."
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manure.71 Lies Sari's work evokes a sense of place about South Blitar, beyond the 
images of arid limestone villages and a people burdened by poverty, but is 
nevertheless framed by her perception of seeing communists as the agents of 
modernization.72
Lies Sari rejected the idea that the South Blitar episode "was a rebellion" 
(pemberontakan). She refuted the assertion that there were army deserters and weapons 
present in South Blitar, and claimed that statements to that effect were lies concocted 
by "ex- [PKI] Special Bureau traitors" in Jakarta. Instead, she stressed the self-defensive 
nature of the fugitives' presence. She explained that there were PKI leaders who, by 
virtue of their inability to find alternatives in the big cities, were hiding in "forgotten 
villages"—by her definition, villages that had been "left behind"73 and undeveloped.74 
She explained that, "For one year, cadres from mass organizations and the party were 
scattered across the entire south coast who never met one another."75 This statement is 
probably inaccurate, as some cadres worked with two others in well-organized, three- 
person political cells.76 She says about the fugitives, "Only those [cadres] who placed 
them [fugitives]—each village would have several people placed there—knew."77 
These statements taken together contradict one another. Fugitives in South Blitar 
would likely have met others on the run, or in the act of placing or being placed as 
fugitives, and possibly during any political activity, in villages or local houses.
In Rewang's account, he said that, in the South Blitar area, tens (berpuluh-puluh) of 
fugitives gathered. He said, "It went well, the people of South Blitar had not 
experienced [this] before, of people who used to be leaders, living alongside them. We 
implemented the three concepts of working together, sleeping together, and eating 
together."78 The fugitives needed to rely on local people for food and so needed to be 
open about their status of being on the run. Such honesty was confirmed in the account 
of a local villager, Paijo,79 whose recollection contradicts Lies Sari's assertion that the 
villagers were completely ignorant about the nature of the sudden influx of newcomers 
into South Blitar and about politics in general.80 Paijo explained that he himself did not
71 Food crops included rice, cassava, sweet potato, banana, coconut, chillies, and corn. For vegetables, the 
villagers grew bligo, a kind of gourd, pod beans (koro benguk), pumpkin, and winged beans. Lies Sari, 
"Blitar Selatan yang dilupakan," p. 4.
72 On the PKI's contribution to education, see Ruth T. McVey, "Teaching Modernity: The PKI as an 
Educational Institution," Indonesia 50 (October 1990): 5-28.
73 Desa tertinggal.
74 Lies Sari, "Blitar Selatan yang dilupakan," p. 2.
75 Ibid., p. 3; emphasis added.
76 Some South Blitar fugitives were involved in three-person "cells." Each person in the cell was 
responsible for an area of work. In this case, the areas were organization, education, and armed struggle. 
Each cell was connected to an external contact person. Source: interviews with Winata and Tuti.
77 Lies Sari, "Blitar Selatan yang dilupakan," p. 2.
78 Rewang, interviewed by the author. The concept of working together, sleeping together, and eating 
together (Tiga sama, sama kerja, sama tidur, sama makan) was one promoted by Lekra, particularly in the 
"turba," or turun ke bawah (down to the base) policy, which advised Lekra artists to live alongside the 
people in creating their artworks. See also Rhoma Dwi Aria Yuliantri and Muhidin M. Dahlan, Lekra tidak 
membakar buku: Suara senyap Lembar Kebudayaan Harian Rakjat 1950-1965 (Yogyakarta: Merakesumba, 2008).
79 Paijo (pseudonym), interview with Andre Liem. Interview accessed by author at ISSI, Jakarta, July 30, 
2007.
80 Lies Sari, "Blitar Selatan yang dilupakan," p. 3.
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accommodate any fugitives, as his house on a main road was considered less safe than 
others. Some locals assisted as couriers or escorted the "visitors"81 to meet other 
fugitives in the area. A system of couriers and "posts" was used to facilitate 
communication and meetings among the new arrivals, often involving local youths.82 
The newcomers were accustomed to a different way of life in the cities and appeared 
different to their hosts.83 The guests were not accustomed to walking barefoot, at least 
not in the early stages of their stay, and so they walked differently, needing to check 
their footing constantly.84 They were forced to adapt to living conditions in the villages, 
which were relatively more difficult than conditions they experienced in their homes 
before the coup attempt of 1965. Tuti, for example, had had a domestic servant in her 
home in Surabaya. By contrast, in South Blitar, she had to walk an hour each way to 
the spring to bathe.85 This lifestyle in South Blitar, however, allowed relative freedom 
of movement, something that many fugitives had not enjoyed since they fled their 
homes and went into hiding in safe houses in large cities such as Surabaya.
Political Reorganizing: The Meanings of "Resistance"
The South Blitar base was established during a period of continuing unrest in East 
Java. Due to strong local support for Sukarno in East Java, Suharto's formal accession 
to power in March 1966 did not spell a calmer period in that province, which had 
suffered greatly from the mass killings. A Sukarno League (Barisan Sukarno) set up in 
1966 to express support for Sukarno's presidency had some traction in the province, 
although it failed to gain national support and thus did not last long.86 Sumanto, who 
was a school inspector and a trade unionist, told me that he had become a local 
organizer in Barisan Sukarno in Surabaya prior to his arrest in mid-April 1968.87 
Throughout 1967 to mid-1968, Surabaya newspapers reported defections from the 
military, weapons theft, and armed robberies. It was rumored that the PKI was 
regrouping through infiltrating Javanese mystical congregations. On that pretext, the 
army attacked and killed Mbah Suro, a mystic and his followers in Nginggil, Central 
Java, in March 1967.88 In this atmosphere, where, as van der Kroef wrote, the regime
81 Winata, interviewed by the author.
82 Anonymous informant, interviewed by the author, South Blitar, March 1, 2008.
83 Lestari, interviewed by the author.
84 Winata, interviewed by the author.
85 Tuti, interviewed by the author, February 16, 2008.
86 First Deputy Prime Minister Soebandrio initiated Barisan Sukarno in response to Sukarno's speech at the 
cabinet meeting in the Bogor Presidential Palace on January 15,1966. In this speech, Sukarno called upon 
his supporters to unite and defend him in the face of increasing pressure from Suharto and 
demonstrations by university students calling for Sukarno to disband the PKI. Harold Crouch, in his book 
The Army and Politics in Indonesia (Jakarta: Equinox, 2007), pp. 167-68, discusses the formation, and 
cooptation by the army, of Barisan Sukarno. Also see Soebandrio, Yang Saya Alami: Peristiwa G30S, sebelum, 
saat meletus dan sesudahnya (Jakarta: Bumi Intitama Sejahtera, 2006), p. 74. Some interviewees became 
politically involved in the Barisan Sukarno at a local level. Sumanto, interviewed by the author, Blitar,
May 11, 2007.
87 Sumanto, interviewed by the author.
88 Van der Kroef, "Indonesian Communism since the 1965 Coup," p. 40. A highly propagandistic account 
associating Mbah Suro with the PKI can be found in Andalusi, Kisah njata hantjurnja mBah Suro (Surabaya: 
Aneka Karya, 1967). Also see David Mitchell, "Communists, Mystics, and Sukarnoism," Dissent (Autumn 
1968): 28-32.
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kept alive the PKI threat in the minds of the public, the military reported incidents 
around South Blitar and South Malang of robberies and attacks against local village 
leaders and against Islamic preachers who were considered anti-communist or who 
had taken part in anti-communist operations. The military speculated that these 
actions were some kind of payback for past involvement in eradicating the PKI.89 
Islamic groups, notably the Nahdlatul Ulama, urged the military to take decisive action 
to protect them.90 The military also reported that there had been attacks against police 
stations, where weapons had been seized.91 While it is unclear the extent to which these 
incidents were politically motivated, evidently the army had not sufficiently "tamed" 
East Java in the period leading up to the Trisula operation.92 The political taming of 
East Java and other parts of Indonesia was a conscious process for Suharto and his 
supporters, as was evidenced through the use of the term "New Orderization" (peng- 
Orde Baru-an). In his biography of former Brawijaya commander General Basoeki 
Rachmat, Dasman Djamaluddin explained that part of Basoeki's role when he was 
appointed by Suharto as interior minister was to promote acceptance of and legitimacy 
for the New Order regime.93 The Trisula operation represented a key milestone in this 
process of "New Orderization."
In spite of the serious setbacks that the PKI suffered, it had been a party with a 
large following. Its leadership might have been destroyed, but its mass base remained 
and represented a degree of threat to the regime. PKI's support among the peasantry; 
among the workers in various sectors, such as plantation and forestry, and in the local 
administration had not been completely eradicated, in spite of the mass killings and 
imprisonment. The existence of this mass base made it possible for the party to bring 
its surviving leadership, members, and sympathizers to an area such as South Blitar. 
Survival was important, in order to lay the groundwork for future resistance to the 
regime. In 1968, there was still some hope among its opponents that the Suharto 
regime would have difficulties in gaining support. The rifts in the military and signs of 
PKI survival after the mass killings threatened to undermine the new regime. The 
South Blitar base was another reminder that the work to bring East Java to heel was 
still unfinished.
The key controversies in South Blitar are related to the lack of information and the 
proscribed discussion about what occurred in those so-called PKI bases, particularly in 
the period leading up to the Trisula operation in mid-1968. Over the decades, effective 
New Order propaganda about Viet Cong-style guerrillas and communist insurrection 
in South Blitar has blurred the various pragmatic explanations for the base's 
construction. Former political prisoners were unable to put forward their version 
without implicating themselves as communists. How do we account for the
89 Semdam VIII Brawidjaja, Operasi Trisula Kodam VIII Bmwidjaja, p. 3.
90 Sunyoto et al., Banser Berjihad Menumpas PKI.
91 Semdam VIII Brawidjaja, Operasi Trisula Kodam VIII Brawidjaja, p. 12. Sunyoto et al. Banser Berjihad 
Menumpas PKI.
92 M. Jasin, "Saya Tidak Pernah Minta Ampun Kepada Soeharto," pp. 66-72, discusses his role as the 
Brawijaya commander in the "New Orderization" of East Java.
93 Dasman Djamaluddin, Jenderal TNI Anumerta Basoeki Rachmat dan Supersemar (Jakarta: Grasindo, 2008), p. 
117.
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divergences in testimonies among former political prisoners who were in South Blitar?94 
Despite some extensive questioning, informants such as Putmainah and Lestari 
maintained that they were completely uninvolved in any kind of political activities in 
South Blitar, citing reasons such as needing to care for children and, therefore, not 
having any time for political work.95 They maintained strongly that they only came to 
South Blitar to avoid capture and to reunite with their family members, which reveals 
to a certain extent the controversial nature of the South Blitar project, which still leaves 
participants reluctant to discuss aspects of the project that might have involved 
violence. Interviewees want to stress that the violence was committed against them. 
They want to leave no ambiguity about their being the victims of violence. Ambiguities 
could arise, should they confirm the use of any violence by leftists in South Blitar. Both 
Lestari and Lies Sari, interviewed together in Jakarta in 2009, rejected any suggestions 
of armed resistance against the military in South Blitar.96 Lies Sari emphatically denied 
that the fugitives had any intention to commit acts of violence.97 She argued that "PKI 
traitors"98 and Jakarta's New Order regime had concocted the stories of armed 
resistance to justify the military force used against them. For Putmainah, however, her 
husband was a leader of the South Blitar base and she might have been aware of some 
resistance activities carried out by the base, although she maintained she was not 
involved in these.
The isolation of some cadres from others and differences in status can account for 
the inconsistency in testimonies about the purpose and activities of the "base." There 
are also still concerns about the implications of admitting to having been involved in 
attempting to resurrect the PKI during their time in South Blitar. Not all former 
political prisoners denied, like Lies Sari did, that resistance was among their 
motivations for being in South Blitar. I asked my interviewees about the involvement 
of leftist political fugitives in incidents such as attacks on police and military posts, 
robberies, and thefts of weapons. Their responses ranged from outright denial to 
confirmation that there had, indeed, been some involvement. One informant spoke 
about how pro-PKI fugitives carried out assassinations against certain military and 
anti-communist figures, but there is not widespread acknowledgement among 
informants that such drastic acts occurred.99 Not every fugitive was involved in party 
rebuilding work. As far as we can trace from testimonies, some fugitives tried to 
rebuild the party around the South Blitar area by setting up three-person cells. As 
noted earlier, each person was in charge of one particular area: organization, 
education, or armed struggle.100 Winata and Tuti worked together in one cell.101Tuti 
was in charge of education or outreach, trying to seek out former party members and 
supporters. Their intermediary, or external contact person, seemed to have been Gatot
94 Portelli, The Battle o f Valle Giulia, pp. 128 and 132, also notes the divergences in accounts by Italian 
partisans about the Battle of Poggio Bustone on the Umbria-Lazio border.
95 Lestari, interviewed by the author; Putmainah, interviewed by the author, March 1, 2008.
96 Lestari, interviewed by the author; and Lies Sari, interviewed by the author.
97 Lies Sari, "Blitar Selatan yang dilupakan," p. 2, and interview with the author.
98 John Roosa, Pretext for Mass Murder, p. 137, names some PKI members who turned traitor and led the 
authorities to detain other leftists.
99 Winata, interviewed by the author.
100 Ibid.; and Tuti, interviewed by the author.
101 Ibid.
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Sutaryo. Gatot Sutaryo had served earlier as secretary to former Information Minister 
Amir Sjarifuddin, who went on to become prime minister; he was a member of the East 
Java Provincial Committee of the PKI, and, in 1968, secretary of the "project 
committee" of South Blitar.102 It is difficult to find out exactly what the cells did, other 
than to seek to identify and regroup with party members and sympathizers in 
surrounding areas.
The PKI in South Blitar set up structures to facilitate some training in handling 
weapons. These weapons would have been obtained from military deserters and 
through theft and black-market purchases.103 In our interview, Rewang explained that 
any decision to engage in armed conflict would have been made democratically, in a 
meeting of provincial committees called to approve this course of action.104 He said any 
arms they had were negligible. The military found a small number of weapons when 
they captured two detachments of youth, who, according to the military, were being 
trained by the PKI in "armed struggle." In all there were only thirty-four firearms, 
some of them "old weapons," and a few blowpipes.105 The military noted that the 
shortage of arms and combat skills led the fugitives to hide among villagers to avoid 
clashes.106 It would seem that any armed resistance by the PKI was in its infancy at this 
time and was hampered by a shortage of resources, such as trainers, weapons, and 
ammunition.
The desire to resist the regime was strong, however, among some fugitives. Winata 
was one interviewee for whom resistance was important. As he lived in a small village 
on the outskirts of a district capital, when interviewed he was somewhat concerned 
about his safety and insisted on using a pseudonym. He was prepared to discuss the 
use of violence provided I would not use his real name. Winata explained the 
advantages of South Blitar as a place of refuge and touched on the theme of resistance:
The area was totally red [politically]. Even if the geographic conditions were not 
completely ideal for us to conduct resistance, the people could be relied upon for 
our protection. The proof was that we lasted two years there, before our 
destruction in 1968.107
Winata decided to join the South Blitar refuge because he was fearful of being 
arrested again after his release from Jakarta's Salemba prison in 1966. He had only 
served one year there. According to him, soon after his release, in Jakarta he came 
across an article in the newspaper Suluh Indonesia accusing him of having been a 
communist during his time in Europe as a student.108 To avoid possible repercussions 
from the article, he quickly departed Jakarta for his village in East Java:
102 Semdam VIII Brawidjaja, Operasi Trisula Kodam VIII Brawidjaja, pp. 297-98.
103 Ibid., p. 27.
104 Rewang, interviewed by the author. Convening the provincial committees across Java in South Blitar 
would have been a difficult task, but this difficulty might have been tackled by requiring a certain number 
of committee members already present in South Blitar to represent their respective committees.
105 Semdam VIII Brawidjaja, Operasi Trisula Kodam VIII Brawidjaja, p. 27.
106 Ibid., p. 34.
107 Winata, interviewed by the author.
108 Ibid.
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At the end of 1966, I returned to my home village. I took that particular decision 
because I was afraid of being captured or killed.109
He did not feel safer there. He said, "Rather than dying uselessly [mati konyol], I 
decided to join in and go to South Blitar, to hide there." He explained that he had 
decided he could either wait to be harassed or attacked by local youths, or he could 
take his life in his own hands and try his luck in South Blitar. He said, "It was better to 
resist [berlawan] than to die for no reason."110Tuti, who worked with Winata in a three- 
person cell, also echoed this theme of resistance. She said that those who were hunted 
"like animals" had the right to defend themselves.111 PKI leaders Rewang and Munir 
(the latter in his defense statement) each expressed similar sentiments. In our 
interview, Rewang noted that when the Trisula operation smashed the PKI base, 
"actually, we had not begun; we were still making preparations."112 In order for armed 
resistance to succeed, he said, there needed to have been "many areas like South 
Blitar." He cited other attempts by remnants of the PKI to form such bases, as in the 
Merapi-Merbabu area in Central Java, in West Kalimantan,113 and in Sulawesi. He said 
the bases in Kalimantan and Sulawesi enjoyed "good terrain" (medannya baik) for 
struggle, but that they, too, were unable to hold out. According to Rewang, the role of 
such "base area projects" (proyek daerah basis) was to "lay the foundation for armed 
resistance bases."114
There were differences of opinion among former PKI members in South Blitar 
regarding armed resistance and the most effective moments to deploy violent tactics. 
While the PKI leaders and perhaps their followers shifted their thinking more in favor 
of taking up arms against the state because of the violence they had faced, there were 
various disagreements about when and where any attacks should take place. Guy 
Pauker, a pro-military American researcher employed by the US government- 
sponsored Rand Corporation,115 who kept a close eye on the PKI, pointed to these 
differences among party leaders. In his 1969 report, Pauker contends that:
Some of the leaders argued that armed struggle be undertaken only after the 
PKI's underground structure was rebuilt on a strong mass basis, others engaged
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid.
111 Tuti, interviewed by the author.
112 Rewang, interviewed by the author.
113 Jamie S. Davidson, From Rebellion to Riots: Collective Violence on Indonesian Borneo (Madison, WI: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 2008), pp. 62-84, describes the PKI's founding of the Tentara Komunis 
Kalimantan Barat (TKKB, Communist Army of West Kalimantan) in late 1965 or early 1966, and its 
subsequent alliance with the PGRS (Pasukan Gerilya Rakyat Sarawak, Sarawak People's Guerrilla Force). 
Operations continued against the PKI and PGRS/Paraku until the mid-1970s.
114 Rewang, interviewed by the author.
115 Katharine E. McGregor, History in Uniform: Military Ideology and the Construction o f Indonesia's Past 
(Singapore: NUS Press, 2007), pp. 65-66, argues that the Rand Corporation was a "Cold War watchdog for 
the American government." See also Budiawan, "Seeing the Communist Past through the Lens of a CIA 
Consultant: Guy J. Pauker on the Indonesian Communist Party Before and After the '1965 Affair,"' Inter- 
Asian Cultural Studies 7,4 (2006): 650-62.
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in isolated terroristic attacks on the Army and on Moslem civilians who had been 
involved in the anti-communist massacres of early 1966.116
PKI leader Mohammad Munir identified a weakness that undermined preparations 
for a greater resistance against the regime. In his defense speech in 1973, Munir spoke 
of a certain hastiness that alerted the regime to the presence of PKI members in South 
Blitar.
The armed resistance was defeated because, on one hand, the PKI leadership 
couldn't control their haste in trying to rebuild the party, making it easy for the 
regime to sniff our presence. The regime's immense power struck the PKI when 
our preparations for battle were far from ripe.117
However he did not elaborate on the attacks that Pauker described as "isolated" 
and "terroristic." Winata argued that some attacks were ill-conceived and were the 
result of impatience or anger.118 He claimed that anti-military attacks "close to the entry 
points into the [hiding] area" were unwise, as they drew attention to the presence of 
anti-government groups and hindered the fugitives' own movements.119 He discussed 
some of the attacks in which leftists might have played a part. For example, fugitives 
donned fake army uniforms to trick those who might have executed communists in the 
past— Banser members, for instance—to come "on operation in the south [South 
Blitar]."120 Thinking they were going with the military, some Banser members agreed, 
and then they were killed along the way.121 Sunyoto, citing Romdhon, the founder of 
Banser in Blitar, identified several NU kiai and Banser members who were killed in 
such attacks,122 which were few in number. Instead of systematically challenging the 
regime, these small actions succeeded in attracting the attention of the authorities.
The Trisula Operation
The targeting of pro-government and religious figures in the area spurred the 
renewal of an earlier alliance, dating back to 1965, between Banser and the army to 
fight the PKI.123 At first, military operations involving Batallions 521, 527, and 511 of 
the Brawijaya Division proved ineffective.124 Partly this was because the local civil 
defense guards, hansip, were passing on information about military movements to
116 Guy Pauker, "The Rise and Fall of the Indonesian Communist Party," Rand Corporation Memorandum, 
1969, pp. 61-62.
117 Pledoi [Defense Speech] Mohammad Munir, Dokumen-dokumen Pengadilan Munir, 4 of 7, AKSI News 
Service, circulated by email on September 23,1995. Emphasis added.
118 Winata, interviewed by the author; and Tuti, interviewed by the author (February 16, 2008).
119 Winata, interviewed by the author.
120 Ibid.
121 Ibid.
122 Romdhon named these victims as Kiai Maksum, from Plosorejo, Kademangan; Manun, from Dawuhan; 
Susanto, a member of the Indonesian Nationalist Party, who was also a school principal at Panggungasri; 
Sastro, head of the Department of Information in Binangun; and two Banser members, who were on guard 
duty in Panggung Duwet. Sunyoto et al, Banser Berjihad Menumpas PKI, p. 166.
123 Sunyoto et al., Banser Berjihad Menumpas PKI, p. 166.
124 Ibid., p. 167.
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fugitives. The military in response replaced the locals working as hansip with members 
of Banser and began planning a much larger operation.125
The Trisula operation was a counterinsurgency led by commanding officer Colonel 
Witarmin from the 18th Airborne Infantry Brigade (Brigif Linud 18/Trisula), a brigade 
attached to the Strategic Army Reserve Command (Kostrad). The operation began in 
June 1968 and formally ended with a ceremony on September 7, 1968, at the operation 
headquarters in Lodoyo.126As a classic counterinsurgency operation, Trisula was 
guided by the idea that the guerrillas must be separated from the people, even if the 
people themselves became casualties.127 In the lead up to the operation, local 
administrators and functionaries were replaced with "caretakers," often from the 
military.128 Each battalion placed a company of soldiers in each of the villages for 
which it was responsible.129 The military methodically restricted movement through 
the area by instituting identity checks. It compiled data on the residents of each village. 
Cattle, which had hitherto roamed freely, now had to have registered owners.130 
Checkpoints were erected 300 to 400 meters apart throughout South Blitar. Public 
gatherings were prohibited without permission from the military commander. 
Putmainah became concerned about these changes, and so she smuggled her children 
out of South Blitar with women traders going to market, before it became too difficult 
to move through the area. Other mothers, such as Lestari,131 left it too late and had to 
leave their children with local villagers when they went on the run.
In South Blitar, people still recall how they fared during the military operation. The 
local population was averse to helping the military. Local men disappeared during 
daylight hours on the pretext of cultivating food gardens away from their houses.132 
The military drafted locals into taking part in foot patrols, carrying equipment such as 
field radios, and "managing" detainees. The task of managing detainees included, 
according to testimonies, digging mass graves and pushing the detainees' bodies into 
them, or helping to dispose of bodies in natural grave pits, such as the one at Luweng 
Tikus (Rat's Hole). Paijo, interviewed by Andre Liem, recalled that the military
125 Winata, interviewed by the author.
126 The Trisula Taskforce's command headquarters, and the base of all elements of the operations, were in 
Lodoyo, a subdistrict center. Combat, territorial, and intelligence operations were to be simultaneously 
mounted by two main arms of operation, that is, units of the Brawijaya Territorial Command and units 
from the Trisula Taskforce. The operation called on entire sections of the Brawijaya command, including 
nonmilitary or logistical support units such as the engineering corps and equipment, transport, 
information, and field-hospital operations; as well as religious advisers. Reserves from the Para 
Commando Regiment of the Army (Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat, RPKAD) and one infantry 
unit from the Central Java Diponegoro Division were also on standby.
127 See, for example, Brian McAllister Linn, The US Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 
1899-1902 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), p. 165.
128 In Pasiraman village, nine village functionaries had a military background, from the village head
(kepala desa) to those at lower levels, such as the kebayan, who assisted the village head in carrying out 
administrative functions. Mr. Y, interview, South Blitar, March 1, 2008.
129 Semdam VIII Brawidjaja, Operasi Trisula Kodam VIII Brawidjaja, p. 67.
130 Ibid., p. 85.
131 Lestari, interviewed by the author, Jakarta, April 26, 2007.
132 Semdam VIII Brawidjaja, Operasi Trisula Kodam VIII Brawidjaja, p. 89.
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transported him and ten other men to a certain area to dig these pits.133 He told Liem 
that forty prisoners, bound by rope in groups of four, then arrived from Bakung. 
Several soldiers executed these prisoners, mainly by shooting them in the chest. After 
the shootings, Paijo and the ten men were told to bury them. It took the gravediggers 
around two hours to complete the task. The soldiers encouraged the men to take any 
"good clothing" from the bodies before burying them, but none of the men took 
anything. When asked why they refused, Paijo explained:
Because I used to be BTI134 myself, [they were] like friends. Imagine what I would 
have said, if I was wearing [a dead man's] sarong and one of their family 
members asked, why are you wearing my father's sarong?"135
This sense of identification with the victims meant that the killings had a great 
impact on Paijo and the other men. Paijo said, "We felt very moved [terharu], because 
we knew the victims."136 It was unclear whether he knew them personally, as he did 
not name them, or whether he had simply felt that he and the victims shared 
characteristics. After the burial, the men returned to the command post in the village, 
located in Mr. Gun's house, and they were warned by the soldiers to say nothing about 
what they had just seen. Villagers, often detainees, who were forced to help carry out 
killings or clean up in the aftermath, in turn became a source of information for the 
families of victims. Mrs. S., a widow, traced her husband's fate through testimonies 
from other villagers who were present at his death.137 They told her that he had been 
beaten on the back of the head with a metal bar, as a result of which he fell into the 
deep vertical cave at Luweng Tikus, which held dozens of bodies.138 Villagers refused 
to participate in the killings and cleanup wherever they could, but it was not always 
possible to resist the soldiers' threats.
The operation increasingly affected villagers in ever more intrusive ways. In June 
1968, to exert more pressure on those on the run, the military evacuated thousands of 
people from hamlets and villages, and placed them in holding camps for several days 
at a time.139 In these camps, the military delivered speeches to villagers instructing 
them to refuse to help communists, or they, the villagers, would be killed.140 Airplanes 
also dropped leaflets in the villages containing similar messages. With these 
evacuations, people faced the choice of remaining in the villages and being interned— 
or fleeing into the forested surroundings. The military produced a lasting symbol of
133 Paijo (a pseudonym), interviewed by Andre Liem, date unknown, at Indonesian Institute of Social 
History, Jakarta. Accessed July 25, 2007.
134 BTI, the Indonesian Peasants' Union, was a mass leftist organization that was politically close to the 
PKI and had many members in the South Blitar area.
135 Paijo, interviewed by Andre Liem.
136 Ibid.
137 Mrs. S., interviewed by Lakpesdam NU.
138 Ibid. On Luweng Tikus, see Adi Prinantyo, "Goa Tikus Saksi Sejarah Kelam Blitar Selatan," Kompas, 
August 27, 2002.
139 Semdam VIE Brawidjaja, Operasi Trisula Kodatti VIII Brawidjaja, p. 206, discusses an example of such an 
evacuation between June 22 and July 5,1968. Twelve villages were identified as evacuation meeting points. 
These were Sumberejo, Suruhwadang, Lorejo, Kaliwaru, Kaligrenjeng, and Tumpak Kepuh in the eastern 
zone, administered by Batallion 231. In the western zone, under Batallion 511, were Sawahan, Maron, 
Krisik, Prede El, Bakung, and Sidomulyo.
140 Mrs. ]., interviewed by Lakpesdam NU, 2005.
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South Blitar in the form of the ruba (an acronym for ruang bawah tanah, underground 
spaces).141 Ruba could be naturally occurring caves on the south coast or holes 
deliberately dug as hiding places. The military pointed to these hiding places as 
evidence that the PKI was setting out to emulate the Vietnamese communists, who had 
developed a system of underground tunnels.142 The Mbultuk Cave, now a tourist 
attraction in the Blitar area, is one example of a limestone cave that was used as a 
hideout. The ruba were especially invoked to support the military's propaganda, well 
after 1968, that the Blitar base was the home of a fully fledged guerrilla movement. 
Rather, the ruba came about as a result of necessity, and to take advantage of the 
fugitives' natural surroundings.
At the end of June 1968, the fugitives at large were increasingly confined to the 
"marginal areas." These included relatively inaccessible cliff tops and caves, over 
which helicopters and planes flew low to attack. To avoid capture, the remaining 
fugitives traveled alone or in smaller and smaller groups, as it became impractical and 
dangerous to travel in large numbers. Domestic food gardens and plants that grew 
wild in the forest were important sources of nourishment for those who remained at 
large. Winata, Tuti, and Putmainah survived on raw cassava, cassava leaves, sweet 
potatoes, and forest snails.143 Reacting to the increasing vulnerability of the remaining 
fugitives, intelligence agents directed people to destroy edible plants around the 
forests to starve the scavengers. In the face of such pressure, many people began to 
surrender. Men who surrendered had their heads shaved to distinguish them from 
everyone else. They were called the Bald-headed Troops (Pasukan Gundul) and were 
deployed on construction and other military projects. Much to the delight of the field 
commanders, many key PKI leaders had been arrested by the end of July. Ruslan 
Wijayasastra, (chairperson of PKI's emergency committee), was captured on July 13, 
1968, in the kitchen of a local villager during an unseasonal downpour.144 On the same 
day, Munir was captured in an underground emplacement.145 Rewang, in turn, was 
caught on July 20 during a military operation.146 By early August, all the former 
political prisoners I interviewed for this essay had been captured.
The South Blitar-linked prisoners served long jail sentences (ranging from more 
than fifteen years to life), were executed, or were sentenced to death.147 Deemed to be
141 At Jakarta's Museum of Communist Treachery, the South Blitar "comeback attempt" by the PKI is 
represented by a diorama showing the mountainous terrain of the area, with two soldiers walking along, 
oblivious to the ruba, or underground tunneling, beneath their feet, which is visible to the museum 
audience, as the diorama shows the cross section of the hill. See the museum's guidebook, Buku Panduan 
Monumen Pancasila Sakti Lubang Buaya (Jakarta: Pusat Sejarah ABRI, Jakarta [date of publication unknown],
P-21.
142 40 Tahutt Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia II: Masa pembangunan dan pemantapan ABRI (1965-1985) 
(Jakarta: Mabes ABRI and Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, 1985), pp. 4 -5 ,13-19  (photos)..
143 Winata and Tuti (February 16, 2008), interviewed by the author; and Putmainah interviews with the 
author.
144 Semdam VIII Brawidjaja, Operasi Trisula Kodam VIII Brawidjaja, p. 137.
145 Ibid.
146 Ibid., p. 142.
147 In 1985, Gatot Sutaryo, Joko Untung, Pratomo, and Rustomo were executed by firing squad. It was 
thought that they were executed some time during the first three days of July 1985, according to the 
United Nations Economic and Social Council, Report by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. S. Amos Wako, Summary 
or Arbitrary Executions, Commissions on Human Rights, Forty-second Session, agenda item 12, February 7,
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"outsiders" or interlopers, those who had traveled to South Blitar simply to hide were 
quickly transported to other prisons in Java. Male prisoners were first transported to 
Malang's Lowokwaru Prison. At the end of August, senior PKI leaders, such as 
Rewang, Ruslan, Iskandar Subekti, Sukatno, Djadiwirosubroto, and Mardjoko, were 
transferred to Jakarta to be tried.148 The South Blitar-linked prisoners experienced 
extreme deprivation and were treated as dangerous criminals. Eight women held in 
Malang Prison shared a woven mat on the floor on which to sleep. Unable to receive 
external parcels (kiriman), they were severely malnourished in the first two years of 
their imprisonment.149 After some six years in Malang, Tuti was moved to Madiun, 
then to another prison near where she was to be tried. Tuti and Winata were tried 
together in one of the district capitals in East Java, near the area where they had been 
active. 150 Several charges were brought against them of trying to mount an 
insurrection, committing violent acts against the authorities, and trying to resuscitate 
the PKI.151 Their trials led the government to argue that South Blitar prisoners had 
received due process. However, the extent to which they had received fair trials was 
questionable. Tuti refused the court's offer of a defence attorney, telling the judge that 
"the decision was already in [his] pocket." In Tuti's account of her trial, commenced in 
1977, nine years after her arrest, she described that in one week, several witnesses, who 
were other PKI leaders, testified that they were not familiar with her political work. In 
spite of this, the judge still convicted her and sentenced her to seventeen years in 
prison, without regard for the time she had already spent in detention.
The members of the PKI Central Committee arrested in South Blitar were charged 
and tried in courts in Jakarta. Some of the prisoners from Pamekasan Prison, namely 
Gatot Sutaryo, Rustomo, and Joko Untung, were executed in 1985.152 Others on death 
row, like Iskandar Subekti, Ruslan Widjajasastra and Sukatno, remained in jail in 
Jakarta until their deaths in 1993,1995, and 1997 respectively.153
"Singing Birds": The Question of Betrayal
The wave of arrests in July and early August 1968 was the result of what the 
Brawijaya Division termed "tactical interrogations," interrogation that induced 
detainees to cooperate with the authorities.154 Betrayal was not just an issue in the 
earlier purges in 1965-66.155 It also resonated within the South Blitar group of former 
political prisoners. For example, the military arrested PKI East Java provincial
1986. See also The Jakarta Post, "Justice Minister on Execution of CP leaders," August 31,1985, which 
reported that the executions occurred on Madura Island in July 1985. (That article's text was reprinted by 
Joint Press Reporting Service, Southeast Asia Report, JPRS-SEA-85-149, September 30,1985, pp. 3—4.)
148 Rewang, interviewed by the author.
149 Tuti, interviewed by the author, February 16, 2008.
1501 have not named the precise town to protect the identities of those whom I interviewed.
151 Winata and Tuti (February 16, 2008), interviewed by the author.
152 "Justice Minister on Executions of CP Leaders," The Jakarta Post, August 31,1985, as reproduced by the 
Joint Press Reporting Service, JPRS-SEA-85-149, September 30,1985.
153 Ruslan and Sukatno died while they were still officially political prisoners.
154 Semdam VIII Brawidjaja, Operasi Trisula Kodam VIII Brawidjaja, pp. 137,140.
155 Roosa, Pretext for Mass Murder, p. 137, presents some well-known cases of PKI members and leaders 
who collaborated with the authorities.
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secretary Suwandi on June 12 and paraded him through South Blitar, where he spoke 
at public meetings urging others to give themselves up.1"0 One interviewee termed this 
"singing like a bird, urging the other birds to come in."156 57 Tuti had heard that Suwandi 
was tortured for three days, which possibly led him to help the military in the end.158 A 
photograph of Suwandi at the Brawijaya Museum showed him with his hands bound 
by thick rope while being interrogated. Allegations that he had been severely tortured 
notwithstanding, he was ostracized by some of the male political prisoners in 
Madura's Pamekasan Prison due to the perception that he had betrayed their cause. 
Suwandi developed a heart condition and died around 1987. What could be the reason 
for this rancor? Betrayal was viewed with derision in the 1965-66 wave of arrests, but, 
quite simply, the nature of the party and its activists had changed even further by the 
time of the Trisula operation. From operating as an open, legal party, the PKI—or 
rather, its surviving members and leaders—became largely transformed by necessity 
into a furtive, underground presence between 1965 and 1968, which manner of 
existence demanded different qualities of its cadres.
SUWANDI CDB JATIM SEDANG Dl INTERVIEW 
KASI INTEL SATGAS TRISULA
Suwandi, provincial secretary of the Indonesian Communist Party, in East Java under interrogation 
after his arrest. Photograph of a picture in an exhibit, Brawijaya Museum, Malang
156 Semdam VIJI Brawidjaja, Opernsi Trisula Kodam VIII Brawidjaja, pp. 91-92.
157 Winata, interviewed by the author.
158 Tuti, interviewed by the author, February 16, 2008.
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In South Blitar, PKI members and sympathizers were forced to deal with an 
organized armed, military response, requiring finely attuned skills for living on the 
run, and a certain amount of discipline. Remembering how PKI members and leaders 
had collaborated with the authorities in the 1965-66 purges,159 PKI cadres now 
regarded such cooperation in any form with disdain. Winata explained that "the rules 
in the field" in South Blitar were especially tough—even to disclose one's real name to 
the authorities constituted an act of betrayal. Even in their every day dealings, South 
Blitar fugitives, therefore, used several aliases.160 In Tuti's case, her captors only 
discovered her actual identity because she neglected to erase her real name from the 
temples of her spectacles. Tuti, however, also blamed her comrades' cooperation with 
the authorities in confirming her identity. The PKI's rapid growth in the first half of the 
1960s and its mass membership, she argued, had resulted in a shortage of trained 
cadres who were disciplined and loyal in times of hardship. During her interrogation, 
Tuti was ordered to write a statement to convince others to surrender.161 She refused 
the military's request, on the grounds that many fugitives saw such deeds as 
dishonorable and, therefore, this tactic would not have convinced them to surrender. I 
believe that Tuti told me this story as a distinct counterpoint to the tale of Suwandi's 
collaboration with the military. Rewang felt that betrayal was "normal" or 
understandable, given the pressure of the times. In contrast, low-ranking cadres 
seemed to take a hard line against those accused of "betrayal." Winata gave a carefully 
worded response when I asked him about accusations of betrayal among former South 
Blitar prisoners. He prefaced his remarks by emphasizing that he did not condone 
working with the military. He went on to explain that that his more tolerant attitude 
toward Suwandi was molded by his sense of indebtedness, as in the past Suwandi had 
secured the release of Winata's wife from prison.162 The fugitives in South Blitar held a 
glimmer of hope that the New Order regime could be overcome. However limited their 
resistance might have been, the thought that traitors had undermined their efforts 
made it all the more painful.
South Blitar and the 1965-66 Repression: Remaking the Connections
During the New Order regime, Rewang and others could not speak openly about 
their South Blitar experiences without implicating themselves as communists. The 
experiences of former political prisoners who had been in South Blitar, including 
stories of their imprisonment there, were different from the experiences of other 
political prisoners who had not been in South Blitar. By the late 1970s, many political 
prisoners associated with 1965 had been released.163 The bulk of former political 
prisoners had no experience of living in South Blitar, as they were in prison during the
159 Roosa, Pretext for Mass Murder, p. 137.
160 The use of a number of pseudonyms is evident in the personal information concerning those whom the 
military dubbed tokoh, important figures in the PKI, who were arrested in South Blitar; see: Semdam VIII 
Brawidjaja, Operasi Trisula Kodam VIII Brawidjaja, pp. 289-310. Also confirmed by Tuti, interviewed by the 
author, February 16, 2008.
161 Tuti, interviewed by the author, February 16, 2008.
162 Winata, interviewed by the author.
163 Greg Fealy, The Release o f Indonesia's Political Prisoners: Domestic versus Foreign Policy, 1975-1979 (Clayton: 
Monash Asia Institute, 1995).
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years 1967-68, the most critical years of the period in question. Buru Island prison 
camp closed down in 1981,164but some South Blitar prisoners were still incarcerated 
until the late 1990s—this was particularly true for death-row inmates. Most of the 
political prisoners seized in 1965-66 were never tried in a court of law, with the 
exception of those subjected to Extraordinary Military Tribunals (Mahkamah Militer 
Luar Biasa, abbreviated "Mahmillub"). It is questionable, if in content, the Mahmillub 
could be considered a court of law.165 As discussed earlier, many PKI leaders arrested 
in South Blitar were tried in ordinary courts and led the government to claim that their 
legal rights had been upheld.166 The nature of the charges goes some way to explain 
why even today some former South Blitar prisoners insist on their anonymity and still 
use pseudonyms, which suggests that there is stigma or discomfort triggered by being 
associated with South Blitar. Some refused to grant interviews, refused to allow 
interviews to be recorded,167 or went to great lengths to deny that they had engaged in 
any acts of resistance, violent or otherwise, against the regime. Apparently the New 
Order portrayal of the fugitives as insurrectionary communist guerrillas continues to 
hold sway. These differences in experiences between groups of political prisoners also 
account for the disagreements about the correct tactics to survive and regroup 
following the 1965-66 mass killings and imprisonment.
There were also recriminations against some of the leaders who set up the South 
Blitar base. Some leftists who were invited to join the base in 1968 were sceptical and 
chose not to go to South Blitar.168 In defending his course of action, Rewang explained 
that sharp disagreements about the bases' legitimate functions appeared only after the 
victory of Trisula. He explained that, in his view, the debates about and condemnation 
of South Blitar as a poor sanctuary, and a poor choice of tactics, only arose in hindsight, 
in the context of the base's defeat. He said that those criticisms came from "outsiders" 
and, in contrast, those in South Blitar were "solid."169 He also felt that the 
condemnation came from "outside [South Blitar], such as in Buru [Island prison camp]. 
It was only after the fact that they said it was adventurism."170 He held steadfast that, 
"armed struggle was only because of armed oppression [by the military]. If the people 
don't have their own force, then they can't win."171 This ongoing debate, some forty 
years old, reveals to us the fractures in this group of people who in a sense shared a
164 Hersri Setiawan, Kamus Gestok (Yogyakarta: Galang Press, 2003), p. 287.
165 The Mahmillub has been discredited as a tribunal set up by the military after army officers already 
concluded that the PKI was guilty of involvement in the 30th September Movement. See, for example, 
John Roosa, Pretext for Mass Murder, p. 6. For some consideration of the defendants' Mahmillub 
testimonies, however, see Harold Crouch, "Another Look at the Indonesian'Coup'," Indonesia 15 (April 
1973): 1-20.
166 Majalah Tempo Online, "Sukatno siap didor," October 2,1993, at http: / / majalah.tempointerakhf.com 
/ id /arsip /1993/10 /02/N A S /mbm.l9931002.NAS4544.id.html, accessed March 15, 2010.
167 Rewang, for example, refused my initial request for an interview in 2008 about South Blitar. After being 
persuaded to participate by another former South Blitar detainee, he agreed to be interviewed in February 
2009. "Tub" and "Winata" are pseudonyms. Tuti refused to have our first interview (August 2, 2007) 
recorded. Two men in South Blitar, who had been involved in Lekra's cultural activities in the 1960s, gave 
their testimonies anonymously.
168 Hersri Setiawan, interviewed by the author, Jakarta, April 27, 2007.




certain history, but remained with distinct experiences: those like Rewang, who lived 
the South Blitar life of exile, and those with similar ideals who were already in prison 
in the late 1960s.
At times, South Blitar leaders were also blamed for the plight of other political 
prisoners already incarcerated, and for the fate of South Blitar villagers. In 1968, there 
was an atmosphere of heightened alert and increased monitoring prior to and during 
the Trisula operation. Prisoners held in other prisons in Java complained of markedly 
worse treatment during the period surrounding the operation. Adam Soepardjan, a 
metalworkers' unionist, alleged that in 1968 a campaign to starve those incarcerated in 
Kalisosok Prison, in Surabaya, during which hundreds died, was the authorities' 
payback for ongoing PKI activities.172 Those who might otherwise have merely been 
placed on watch lists were arrested in operations in Jakarta because they had family 
roots in Blitar or nearby towns.173 Another criticism against the leftist fugitives from 
within their own ranks focuses on the fate of villagers after the operation. Following 
the operation, villagers were forced to cope with "rehabilitation." Military officers 
were placed in village government positions, villages were redesigned, and the 
population in some cases was relocated into several major centers for surveillance 
purposes. Villagers had been imprisoned, registered, and displaced from their homes, 
and had their movement restricted. During their June 1969 visit to the area, officials 
Bartley and Kenney from the US Consulate in Surabaya praised the Trisula operation 
as a successful example of counterinsurgency, though conceding that the area was a 
"soft target."174 A former political prisoner who now heads a survivors' organization in 
Solo told me that the fate of the South Blitar villagers was Rewang's "personal 
responsibility." He said because the villagers suffered a great deal during the 
operation, out of discomfort, Rewang never returned to South Blitar.175 Indeed, 
Rewang did not return to South Blitar after his imprisonment, but in our interview he 
explained that this was to avoid government accusations that he was returning there to 
stir up the local community.176 The assertion that villagers were resentful towards the 
fugitives, or that they bore responsibility for the fate of the villagers, also conflicts with 
other testimonies177 showing the warm and continuing bond that was built between the 
fugitives and the villagers, even after captured fugitives were released from prison. 
While they lived under the New Order regime, it was safer for former political 
prisoners and the villagers to maintain the perception that there was no further contact 
between them after the end of the Trisula operation.
Despite increased attention in the last decade to the repression of the PKI, the 
South Blitar period of the party's history has been relatively little discussed, possibly
172 Adam Soepardjan, Mendobmk Penjara Rezim Soeharto: Kisah Nyata Anak Manusia (Yogyakarta: Ombak, 
2004), pp. 268-70. A report in the Economist, November 30,1968, discusses "hundreds and perhaps 
thousands" of inmate killings in Javanese prisons by guards and soldiers. The highest number of deaths 
resulted from the South Blitar events and occurred between June and September 1968 (as cited in Van der 
Kroef, "Indonesian Communism," p. 51).
173 Haroto, interviewed by the author, Jakarta, July 28, 2007.
174 Department of State airgram, "Inspection Trip to South Blitar," Report from D.T. Kenney, US Consulate 
Surabaya to American Embassy Jakarta, A-12, June 29,1969.
175 Confidential interview, Solo, February 14, 2009.
176 Rewang, interviewed by the author.
177 Tuti, interviewed by the author, February 16, 2008.
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because of doubts about how to deal with the ambiguity of questions of resistance 
against the regime. This article has tried to expand the historiography that is available 
about South Blitar in the framework of contributing to a growing body of work 
focused on the experiences of survivors of political violence. Violence in Java against 
the political left continued beyond the initial wave of killings and imprisonments in 
1965-66. While there are many differences in the experiences of those who were 
already incarcerated in 1965-66 and those present in South Blitar, I have sought to 
emphasize the relationship between the 1965-66 killings and imprisonments with the 
South Blitar phase. What happened to those who survived the initial mass killings and 
purges—at least for a period? This article has extended "the story" of the political 
repression beyond the 1965-66 period to encompass those who, up through mid-1968, 
survived on the run and were part of a controversial "base building" effort in the 
southern reaches of East Java. The continuing domination of the New Order version of 
the history of South Blitar makes it even more important to establish this continuum, 
particularly in light of the growing historical reappraisal regarding the mass killings 
and imprisonment. For survivors, it is impossible to escape completely the dominance 
and therefore the effects on their testimonies, of the regime's version of history, as well 
as the concerns within, for example, sections of the NU leadership, to maintain a 
consensus about the 1960s events. In an atmosphere of openness following 
democratization, however, there are far greater possibilities today for survivors to 
revisit the 1968 South Blitar events, as these events were lived and experienced.
